Abstract-With the prevalence of location-based services and geo-functioned devices, the trend of spatial data outsourcing is rising. In the data outsourcing scenario, result integrity must be ensured by means of a query authentication scheme. However, most of the existing studies are confined to a centralized environment. In this paper, we investigate the query authentication problem in distributed environments and focus on the k nearest neighbor (kNN) query, which is widely used in spatial data analytics. We design a new distributed spatial authenticated data structure (ADS), distributed MR-tree, to facilitate efficient kNN processing. Furthermore, we propose a basic algorithm to process authenticated kNN queries based on the new ADS. Apart from the results, some verification objects are generated to guarantee the results' integrity. We also design two optimized algorithms to reduce the size of verification objects as well as the verification cost. Our experiments validate the good performance of the proposed techniques in terms of query cost, communication overhead, and verification time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The amount of spatial data has been increasing at an exponential pace owing to the prevalence of geo-functioned devices such as smartphones and IoT sensors. Querying the huge spatial datasets for big data analytics is often out of the computation capacity of a traditional data owner (DO). Meanwhile, it is normally unaffordable for a small-or mediumbusiness DO to maintain large datasets. As a remedy, database outsourcing has been widely adopted to alleviate the DO's computation overhead and the maintenance cost [1] . More specifically, a third-party service provider (SP) is employed and the owner transfers the data and index to the SP. The client sends queries to the SP, which processes the queries and returns the results to the client on behalf of the DO.
However, the SP is out of the control of the DO and the query results can be tampered with or incomplete. The SP might want to reduce the computation resources and, as a result, return only a subset of the results. The SP can also be sponsored by the DO's rivals and return fictitious results so as to favor those sponsors. As such, the client should verify the results' soundness and completeness. The soundness implies that all the results are originated from the DO. The completeness means that none of the true results are missing. To achieve this, there have been many works on authenticated query processing [1] - [12] . The basic idea is that the DO sends the authenticated data structure (ADS), along with the outsourced data, to the SP. After receiving a query from the client, the SP returns the query results as well as a verification object (VO) for the client to verify the soundness and completeness of results.
To date, most of the authenticated query processing studies are confined to a centralized environment. Due to the large amount of data, the SP can opt to store and process data in a distributed framework. For example, systems such as Spatial Hadoop [13] and Geospark [14] provide spatial queries based on a cluster framework. Therefore, distributed spatial query authentication should be developed to satisfy the SP's guarantee of soundness and completeness. However, the challenge is that the ADS should be designed to well fit the distributed setting and facilitate distributed query processing. Moreover, the VO size should be small enough so that the communication overhead between the SP and the client is light and the client's verification time is short.
In this paper, we consider the distributed query authentication problem for kNN (k nearest neighbor) queries. We propose a new distributed ADS, i.e., distributed MR-tree. It has local and global layers and perfectly suits the distributed master-slave system. After receiving a kNN query from the client, the master node emits a message to some slaves, which will process the query and generate the partial results and VOs. The reducer then consolidates all the partial results as well as the partial VOs and sends them to the client for result verification. We also propose two optimized algorithms to reduce the VO size. The two optimized algorithms spend more query time in return for smaller VOs. The experiments show that the optimized algorithms outperform the basic algorithm in terms of the VO size and only sacrifice a little query cost. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the system scales well with the node number in terms of the system throughput. The paper's contributions are summarized as follows:
• For the first time in the literature, we study the problem of authenticated kNN query processing in a distributed environment.
• We propose distributed MR-tree as an ADS to suit the distributed query processing environment.
• We develop a basic algorithm and two optimization techniques to efficiently process authenticated kNN queries in a distributed fashion.
• We conduct extensive experiments to validate the performance of the proposed techniques in terms of query cost, communication overhead, and verification time. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the cryptographic primitives, spatial ADS, and local authenticated kNN processing as the preliminaries. In Section III, we show the design of the distributed MR-tree, the basic algorithm to process the authenticated kNN queries, and the client verification algorithm. Two optimized algorithms are introduced in Section IV. Section V presents the experiment results. The related work is discussed in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Cryptographic Primitives
Hash Function: A one-way hash function H(·) transforms an arbitrary message m to a fixed-length digest H(m). Oneway indicates that given a message m, the computation of H(m) is easy. However, to get m from H(m) is computationally infeasible. In this paper, we use SHA-1 as the hash function, which maps a given message to a 160-bit digest.
Digital Signature: The asymmetric signature is used to verify the integrity of the data. The owner of data keeps a secret key and publishes the corresponding public key to the verifier. The owner signs the data using the secret key and the verifier can decrypt the signature using the public key and verify the integrity of the data. RSA is one of the popular asymmetric signature algorithms.
Fig. 1. Merkle Hash Tree
Merkle Hash Tree: A Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [15] is used to authenticate a series of data points. It is a binary tree and is built in a bottom-up manner. Each leaf node of an MHT stores the hash value of the corresponding data point. The hash value of an internal node is the hash function of the concatenation of its two child nodes' hash values. The root hash value is signed by the data owner. Given a data point and its sibling hash values on the path from the root to the object, the verifier can reconstruct the root hash value and check whether it is the same as the decrypted signature. If they match, the authenticity of the data point is assured. Figure 1 shows a Merkle Hash Tree. We assume the query is d 2 . The hash values of the grey nodes in Figure 1 are added into the VO, which contains (H 3 ,d 2 ,H 2 ). The client can compute the root hash value by h(h(H 3 |h(d 2 ))|H 2 ) and check its consistency with the decrypted signature. Here h(·) denotes the hash function.
B. Spatial Authenticated Data Structure
MR-tree [3] , which is the combination of the R-tree and the Merkle Hash tree, is often used to process authenticated spatial queries. Each leaf node stores the pointers pointing to the data points and the hash value of the binary concatenation of the data points. The hash value of an internal node is computed by hashing the concatenation of each child node's MBR and hash value. We give an example based on Figure 2 , which depicts the data points and their corresponding MR-tree. The leaf node N 3 's hash value is H(a|b|c), where '|' represents the binary concatenation. The non-leaf node's hash value
Here N 3 , N 4 represent the MBR of node N 3 and N 4 , respectively. We only show three hash values in Figure 2 and other hash values are computed similarly.
C. Local Authenticated kNN Processing
There are mainly two different methods of authenticated kNN processing based on the MR-tree. The algorithm proposed by Yang et al. [3] mainly focuses on the authenticated range query and transforms the kNN query to a range query. The method separates the generation of the results and the VO. It first retrieves kNN results by using any kNN search method. Based on the k results, we can draw a circle centered at the query point q with the radius of the distance between q and the k th result. Then, the authenticated range query is executed to generate the VO set. Another method is to generate the results and the VO set together while traversing the whole MR-tree. Su et al. [5] proposed the authentication of top-k spatial keyword queries and we can transform this query to the authenticated kNN query easily. Algorithm 1 shows the procedure of generating the VO and results altogether. Dequeue priority queue P Q and get object 6: if object is an MBR R i then 7: The algorithm traverses the MR-tree in a best first search manner [16] . We maintain a priority queue P Q. In the while loop, the current nearest object to the point q is dequeued from the priority queue P Q. If the object is a node rather than a data point, each of its child node R j will be enqueued to the P Q. Otherwise, the object is added to the result set because it is a point. The while loop terminates until k results We give an example of the local authenticated kNN processing using Figure 2 . Assume that k=2 and the red point Q is the query point. At first, the P Q contains 
III. DISTRIBUTED KNN AUTHENTICATION
A. Problem Formulation
There are three parties in our system: the data owner (DO), the third-party distributed service provider (SP), and the client. The DO builds the ADS and signs the ADS to ensure the integrity of the data. The ADS and the signature are then sent to the SP. The distributed SP provides the service of storage and query processing. Since the SP is configured in a distributed environment, it consists of several types of nodes: Master, Slave, and Reducer. The Master node in the SP is mainly responsible for dispatching jobs to the corresponding slaves. The Slave nodes are the workers, which process the actual queries. The Reducer consolidates all the partial results as well as the VOs computed by the Slaves and sends them to the client. Finally, the client can verify the soundness and completeness of the results by using the VO, the DO's public key, and the root signature sent by the SP. Threat Model In this system, we consider the DO as the trusted party. The SP is untrusted and can return incorrect results. Given the whole dataset D, the client's query point q, and the parameter k, the SP returns several results. If the result number does not match the value k, the client can find that some results are missing.
where dist(·, ·) denotes the Euclidean distance. The first and second cases violate the soundness and completeness conditions, respectively.
The system's performance can be measured in these metrics: (1) ADS construction time; (2) query processing cost; (3) client's verification time; (4) VO size. We assume that there is no data update in this system. Therefore, the ADS construction is a one-off operation by the DO and the cost can be amortized by the queries. The VO size can influence the communication overhead between the SP and the client as well as the time of client's verification. Therefore, the VO size should be minimized.
B. Distributed MR-Tree
To adapt the MR-tree index structure to the distributed environment, the index structure has two layers: the local index and the global index. The DO first employs the Grid partition or the Sort-Tile-Recursive [17] method to partition the entire dataset into several splits. These methods guarantee that there is no overlap between any two partitions' minimum bounding rectangles (MBRs). Thanks to this non-overlapping characteristic, only a few partitions are used to process the kNN query, which saves the computation resources. The local indexes are constructed using the data points in each partition. The global index is then constructed, and it contains each local MR-tree's root MBR and, root hash value, and the pointers towards each local index. After the construction of the index structure, the DO signs the root node of the global index using the private key. Then, the signature and the entire index will be sent to the SP. The Master of the SP is responsible for dispatching the local indexes to the Slaves according to the current workload of the distributed system. Since the global index is small, it will be stored in the main memory of all the In each partition, the data points are used to build a local MRtree. We use N 1 , N 2 , N 3 and N 4 to represent the four local indexes. The global index is a directory table and can prune the search space.
C. Authenticating Distributed kNN Query Processing
For easy illustration, we first give some definitions, which will be used in the authenticating distributed kNN query processing.
Definition 1: Given a query point q and a set of local
.n] and j = i. Here the dist(·, ·) denotes the minimum distance between a point and a rectangle.
Definition 2: Given a query point q and a set of current partial kNN results {r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k }, a rcircle is a circle centered at q with the radius of dist(q, r k ). Here the dist(·, ·) denotes the Euclidean distance.
Definition 3: Given a rcircle and a set of local MR-trees
Definition 4: Given a set of slave nodes Slaves = {Slave 1 , ..., Slave n }, a home slave HSlave ∈ Slaves is the slave which stores the home index. And a set of candidate slaves CSlaves ⊆ Slaves are the set of slaves which stores candidate trees CT. We assume that in the distributed system, queries are executed by the slaves who store the corresponding local indexes. For example, since the HSlave stores the home index, the first local kNN query should be sent to the HSlave by the Master and the HSlave will execute the query locally. The main objective is to use a small amount of partitions to compute the correct kNN results as well as the VO. The non-overlapping characteristic of the partition method prunes some local indexes, which saves the computation resources. The HSlave first finds the local kNN results in the home index which contains the correct results in a high probability. However, if there are some other points which are closer than the ones in {rs h }, CSlaves need to process extra range queries to find the correct results. The rcircle is used to check whether CSlaves should process the extra queries. Algorithm 2 summarizes the procedure of the Master node and the Reducer node. The procedure of the HSlave and the CSlave is omitted because they simply compute the local queries and send the partial VO and results to the Reducer.
After receiving the kNN query from the client, the Master locates the home index and sends the kNN query request to There is a special case of the distributed kNN processing when the number of data points in a partition is less than k. A skewed distribution of data points may lead to this case. The previous algorithm cannot compute the correct kNN results. In this case, we double the radius of the rcircle and process the range query iteratively. The Reducer checks the result number and sends the message to the Master if the result number is less than k. The Master doubles the rcircle s radius and the new rcircle is sent to the updated CSlaves. This process runs iteratively until the result number exceeds k. Figure 5(c) illustrates the special case. Assume that k is 4 and Q is the query point. N 3 is the home index. During the third iteration, we find 8 points and the iteration terminates. Finally, the Reducer selects 4 nearest points and returns the final RS and V O to the client. In this special case, the VO size is rather large since the radius of rcircle grows exponentially. To avoid this case, in our experiments we use the Sort-TileRecursive (STR) [17] partition method to split the dataset. The STR partition splits the near data points in the same partition and each partition has nearly the same number of data points.
D. Client Verification
The client uses the VO to verify the results' soundness and completeness. The soundness is verified first by reconstructing the root hash value of the distributed MR-tree. The root hash value is the hash value of the concatenation of each local tree's MBR and hash value. If the reconstructed hash value matches the root hash decrypted by the public key of the DO, the soundness is satisfied. The completeness can be verified in the following method. All of the data points and MBRs are extracted from the VO set and the client selects the first k nearest data points and compares them with the RS. If they match, it means that no other points are closer than the RS data points. Also, all of the MBRs must be farther than the k th result point. Algorithm 3 summarizes the procedure of client's verification. 3 and H(N 3 ) are given in nV O. Therefore, the root hash value is computed using four local MR-trees' root hash values and MBRs. After that, the data points and MBRs are extracted from the union of VO. The correct results are {b,c,a,i} and all of the non-result points will be checked whether they are closer than point i. Meanwhile, the MBR of N 5 and N 3 are checked whether they are farther from point i.
Algorithm 3 Client Verification Input k, Point q, RS, V O
E. Robustness Analysis Lemma 1:
If there is no need to invoke the range queries (CT = ∅), the local kNN result rs h will be the final correct results.
Proof: This can be proved by contradiction. If there is a point p which is one of the correct kNN results but not included in the local kNN result, it is either inside or outside the partition. If it is inside the partition, it should be outside the rcircle since all of the points in the rcirlce are added into rs h . There are k points inside the rcircle, so p must be at least (k + 1) th nearest point. This contradicts the assumption that it is one of the correct results. If it is outside the partition, as there is no intersection among the partitions, it must be farther than the current k th result and this contradicts the correct result assumption.
Lemma 2: All of the correct kNN results must reside in the rcircle.
Proof: This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose there is a correct kNN result p which resides outside the rcircle. The radius of rcircle is computed by the distance between the k th current nearest point and the query point. There are at least k data points inside the rcircle because apart from the k local results, there are probably some points in other partitions that are closer than the current k th point. Since p is outside the rcircle, it is at least the (k+1) th nearest point, which contradicts the assumption.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 2 can produce the correct result set.
Proof: This can be proved using Lemmas 1 and 2. Algorithm 3 summarizes the procedure of client verification. The root hash reconstruction guarantees the soundness of the results and the distance comparison protects the completeness. We give the following theorem of its correctness of verification.
Theorem 2: Algorithm 3 verifies the soundness and completeness of the results and can detect the threats mentioned in Section III-A.
Proof: If the adversary returns a fictitious point, which is not included in the dataset, the reconstructed root hash must be different from the decrypted hash value received from the SP because of the collision-resistance characteristic of the hash function. If one data point changes, its corresponding hash value will be different, resulting in the change of the root hash value of MR-tree. Without knowing the secret key, the SP cannot generate a valid signature of the wrong root hash value, which means that the signature is unforgeable. Therefore, the violation of soundness can be detected. If the reconstructed hash value matches the one decrypted, the incorrect result point must reside in the VO set but farther than the correct results. After the client sorts all the data points in the VO set by distance and gets the first k nearest points, the client can notice the difference between k points extracted from the VO and the points in RS. Then the results cannot pass the verification of the completeness.
IV. OPTIMIZATION OF VO SIZE
The VO size determines the communication cost and also the client verification time. In this section, we focus on the optimization of the VO size. Intuitively, the rcircle decides the VO size. A larger rcircle makes more nodes to be visited and hence and more data points to be added to the VO. Therefore, the objective is to reduce the radius of the rcircle. As we can see in Figure 5 (b), the rcircle is much bigger than the circle with the radius of the distance between Q and point i. This is because the distance between Q and e is larger than the distance between Q and i. In Algorithm 2, the rcircle is decided by the local results in home index and will not change during the whole procedure. To compute the minimum rcircle, the optimized algorithm adds the sequential computation of the rcircle before the parallel authenticated range query in Algorithm 2. Recompute CSlaves using final rcircle f
Algorithm 4 VO Optimization Algorithm
16:
Send rcircle f to HSlave and CSlaves 17: end if Algorithm 4 summarizes the procedure of the Master node. The procedure of slaves is omitted because they simply compute the partial results and VOs. First, the Master sends the kNN request to the HSlave and uses the received rcircle to decide the candidate tree list CT and CSlaves. If the CT list is not empty, the Master sequentially updates the rcircle. Since the closer local indexes have the kNN results in a higher probability, the CT list is sorted with the minimum distance. In the for loop in Algorithm 4, the rcircle will be sequentially sent to each CSlave and the rs c will be added into rs h to find the current k th nearest point kobj, which is used to update the rcircle. Note that the for loop terminates immediately when the updated rcircle does not intersect with the CT [i].M BR. This prunes some search space and improves the performance. The CSlaves list is recomputed after the computation of the final rcircle. Since the rcircle changes, the rs h and hV O are recomputed. Also, the Reducer should discard the previously received rs h and hV O when it finds that CT list is not empty. The Master sends the rcircle f to the HSlave and the CSlaves, which compute the range query and VOs in parallel. The Reducer receives all kinds of results and V Os from the Slaves. Then it selects k nearest results and adds them to the RS list. The nV O is also added into the V O. Finally, the RS and V O are sent to the Client. Figure 6 shows an example of the VO optimization. We assume that k = 4 and the query point Q lies in N 2 . The home index is N 2 and the ordered CT list is In Algorithm 4, the rcircle is updated iteratively in the for loop. The definition of the rcircle remains to be the same. As such, the correctness of results and VO generation can still be proved using Lemmas 1 and 2.
Obviously, Algorithm 4 spends more time than Algorithm 2 in query processing because of the sequential update of rcircle. If the |CT | is large, the sequential update consumes too much time. Therefore, we design a hybrid algorithm, in which the rcircle is updated only for l times, where 1 ≤ l ≤ |CT |. Here the value l denotes the level of sequential processing. After l sequential queries, we resort to Algorithm 2 for parallel processing of distributed authentication. The hybrid algorithm uses less range queries to find the optimized rcircle and it balances the trade-off between the VO size and the query time. Note that if the |CT | equals one, the hybrid algorithm and the optimized algorithm are the same because there is only one update of the rcircle.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the proposed distributed query authentication algorithm and optimization techniques. We perform the query evaluation on a computer with Dual 6-core Intel Xeon E5-2620 2.4GHz CPU with 128G RAM. The SP runs on Apache Spark platform locally and we set the slaves (workers) to be 8 in the system. The DO side is set up on a desktop computer with Intel Core i7 CPU and 4GB RAM, running Linux. The dataset of all of the experiments is a New York map file from OpenStreetMap containing 11.56 million data points. We assume that there is no update of the dataset since the bulk loading of ADS construction is quite efficient. Therefore, we employ bulk-loaded STR-tree as our R-tree, which is implemented in JAVA. Moreover, we select the STR as the partition method. The fan-out of the MR-tree is set to 100. The hash function is 160bit SHA-1 and we use 1024-bit RSA algorithm to sign the root hash value. Both SHA-1 and RSA are imported from the java.security package. The index construction, query processing time, result verification time, and VO size are measured. Figure 7 shows the DO's construction time of the MR-tree as well as the R-tree for comparison. The construction time grows linearly with the increasing cardinality. It takes less than half a minute to construct 11.52 million records, which is acceptable. The construction of ADS is a one-time process and further queries can amortize its cost. The construction time of MR-tree is around 20% longer than that of R-tree. This is because building the MR-tree involves the computation of hash values and binary concatenation. Table I shows the index size with different dataset cardinalities. When the cardinality is 11.52 million, the size of MR-tree is only 4 MB larger than the R-tree. The reason is that the SHA-1 hash value is only 160 bit, which is rather small. As a result, it takes the DO and the SP only a few MB to store the extra authenticated data structure. 
A. Cost of Index Construction
B. Distributed Authenticated kNN Query Cost
In this section, we evaluate the query cost of distributed authenticated kNN queries. The selection of the query point influences the query cost in our distributed setting. We call a kNN query as an ERQ if the CT = ∅ during its processing. If the query point is near the center of the partition's MBR and also the k is rather smaller, the query can be an ERQ in a small probability. However, if the query point is near the edge of the partition's MBR, even the k is small, it can be an ERQ in a higher probability. The range queries in an ERQ take more time. To test the average performance of the query cost with different k settings, we randomly select 1,000 data points located in the root MBR of the entire dataset and average the query time. We denote Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 4 as the basic and optimized algorithm, respectively. We compare the query cost performance of the basic, optimized, and hybrid algorithm, where l is set to one for simplicity. Figure 8 (a) shows that the query cost increases with the k's growth. Intuitively, searching more points in a local MR-tree takes longer time. Also, the number of ERQs increases with the larger k and each ERQ takes more time. Table II shows the number of ERQs in the 1,000 query points with increasing k. Furthermore, the basic algorithm runs faster than the other two optimized algorithms. The optimized algorithm and hybrid algorithm run more range queries to reduce the rcircle and this leads to more local query time. The hybrid algorithm and optimized algorithm are the same when |CT | = 1, since both of them run one range query to reduce the rcircle. The efficiency of the hybrid algorithm is not obvious on average because the number of cases of |CT | > 1 is much less than the case of |CT | = 1 (see Table II ). the VO size. In most cases, the query is not an ERQ (see Table  II , there are only 93 ERQ queries out of the 1,000 queries when k = 1, 024), which leads to the same VO size using the basic and two optimized algorithms. When k reaches 1,024, the basic algorithm outputs 174.32 KB VO on average and the two optimized algorithms output 147.82 KB and 147.72 KB on average, respectively. The curve of the hybrid and optimized algorithm overlap heavily because of the limited number of cases that |CT | > 1.
In order to compare the hybrid and optimized algorithm, we set k = 1, 024 and choose three types of query points with different |CT | from the previous selected 1000 queries and evaluate the VO size and query cost. The r hyb is defined as
and r opt is similar. The t bas , t hyb , and t opt represent the query cost of the three algorithms, respectively. In Table III , both the optimized and hybrid algorithm output smaller VO (r hyb > 0, r opt > 0) and take more query time (t hyb > t bas , t opt > t bas ), compared with the basic algorithm. Moreover, the hybrid algorithm takes less query time (t hyb ≤ t opt ) and outputs larger VO (r hyb ≤ r opt ), compared to the optimized algorithm. Figure 8(c) shows the average client verification time. Since the hybrid algorithm and the optimized algorithm output nearly the same size of VO on average, the two curves overlap. Obviously, the verification time is proportional to the VO size. The reduction of verification time becomes more obvious when k is larger and this corresponds to the reduction of VO size. When k is larger, the number of points in the VO increases. Also, each extra range query leads to visit of the corresponding index and contributes to a larger VO. Therefore, the client takes more time to reconstruct the root hash value of each local index. To verify the completeness of the results, the client should sort the results and also the points inside the VO. Therefore, the total verification time increases with larger k.
Finally, we evaluate how the three algorithms scale out with the slave node size varying from 2 to 8. The node size influences the performance of parallel computing and also the throughput of the system. If the number of slave nodes is small, there will be more partitions (local indexes) distributed into the same node, which leads to slower processing of the range query due to the limited cores. We test the throughput when k = 32 and k = 1, 024. The throughput is calculated as the number of jobs completed per minute. Figure 9 shows the throughput of the three algorithms under different node numbers. We can infer that the three algorithms scale well with the node number. The throughput of the hybrid and optimized algorithm is less than the throughput of the basic algorithm since the two optimized algorithms need more range queries to reduce the rcircle. The throughput of the three algorithms has similar performance when k = 32, because the ratio of ERQ is small. However, the throughput of the basic algorithm is obviously higher than the throughput of two optimized algorithms when k = 1, 024 since the ratio of ERQ is higher and there are more cases of |CT | > 1.
VI. RELATED WORK Authenticated query processing has been extensively investigated to verify the authenticity of the results computed by the service provider in the data outsourcing scenario. The Merkle Hash Tree (MHT), which is one of the important ADSs, has been proposed in [15] to verify a series of data points. By adding the signature chains as the authentication information to the spatial data structure, Cheng et al. [6] proposed VKDtree and VRtree to verify the results in multidimensional databases. Yang et al. [3] combined the MHT with the traditional spatial data structure R-tree and proposed the MR-tree with its variant to efficiently verify the spatial data. Cheng and Tan [2] extended the signature chain method and proposed a kNN authentication mechanism on multidimentional databases. A set of data pairs are returned to the client apart from the k results to guarantee the authenticity and the completeness.
More recently, moving kNN has been investigated by Yiu et al. [4] . Hu et al. [18] embedded the Voronoi neighbor information in the signature of the spatial datasets and proposed the VN-Auth to verify kNN, range queries and other advanced spatial queries. Hu et al. [10] addressed the preservation of the location privacy while processing authenticated range queries. Xu et al. [12] recently integrated the relational query authentication with fine-grained access control. There are also some other types of authenticated query processing. Chen et al. [7] developed a novel top-k query authentication based on the cryptography building blocks. Xu et al. [11] considered both authenticity and confidentiality for aggregate queries over set-valued data. Lin et al. [8] proposed a new ADS called MRSky-tree to facilitate the location-based authenticated skyline queries. Chen et al. [9] proposed the authenticated online data integration, which can support multi-source query authentication.
Meanwhile, there are a large body of research on distributed spatial queries. Aji et al. designed the Hadoop-GIS system [19] , which is a spatial data warehousing system and integrates Hive. SpatialHadoop [13] adds the traditional spatial indexes to the native Hadoop framework and supports a variety of spatial queries like range query, kNN, spatial join etc. For inmemory computation over cluster machines, GeoSpark [14] has been proposed to support spatial queries like range, join, and kNN queries. More recently, an more efficient in memory spatial analytics system, called Simba [20] , has been proposed. It supports rich spatial queries and has better throughput than SpatialHadoop and GeoSpark. Nevertheless, none of the system supports the authenticated query processing to guarantee the results' integrity.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the authenticated kNN processing in distributed environments. The distributed MR-tree has been designed to speed up the processing of kNN queries. We propose a basic algorithm to authenticate kNN queries in a distributed fashion, as well as two optimization techniques to reduce the VO size. Our experiments demonstrate that the query costs of the three algorithms are all efficient. The two optimization techniques reduce the VO size and the client's verification time. The hybrid algorithm balances the trade-off between the query cost and the VO size. Furthermore, the throughput of all the algorithms is investigated and the result reveals that the system scales well with increasing the number of nodes. In the future, we plan to design a distributed spatial query authentication system to support more spatial queries and efficient data updates.
